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Economic Effects of the EU External Aviation Policy 
 
Abstract 
This report investigates the economic effects of EU’s external aviation policy with third countries. In particular, 
focusing on 27 countries with which the EU has an Air Services Agreement (ASA) of varying degree of 
liberalization, we assessed changes in fare, flight frequency and capacity utilization. We find that the 
implementation of the EU external aviation policy results in lower fare levels and higher load factors (capacity 
utilization). The effect of the policy on frequency, however, is not statistically significant. Our findings suggest 
that further liberalization can lead to more benefits to consumers. 
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Executive summary 
This report investigates the economic effects of EU’s external aviation policy with third 
countries. In particular, focusing on 27 countries with which the EU has an Air Services 
Agreement (ASA) of varying degree of liberalization, we assessed changes in fare, flight 
frequency and capacity utilization. We find that the implementation of the EU external 
aviation policy results in lower fare levels and higher load factors (capacity utilization). 
The effect of the policy on frequency, however, is not statistically significant. Our findings 
suggest that further liberalization can lead to more benefits to consumers.  
Policy context 
In the last few decades, the European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of market 
liberalization in international air transport. After successfully deregulating its domestic 
market in the 1990s it started exporting its open market policies in 2005 to its 
neighbours and key strategic partners through comprehensive liberalization packages. 
Following the decision of the European Court of Justice in 2002 which overruled its 
member countries’ Bilateral Air Services Agreements (BASAs), the EU has been 
negotiating Air Services Agreements (ASAs) as a block with third countries and regional 
blocks within the framework of its external aviation policy (European Commission 2005; 
European Commission 2016).  
Three levels of agreements between the EU and external partners exist: 
 Horizontal Agreements (HA), which replace the pre-existing BASAs of third 
countries with all EU Member States 
 European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreements, where external partners 
adopt the EU legislation on aviation rules 
 Key Strategic Partner (KSP) agreements, which have wider liberalization focus and 
establish processes for the liberalization of airline ownership, as well as regulatory 
convergence in matters of safety and security, competition, environment and 
passengers’ rights 
Key conclusions 
The overall evidence is strong enough to suggest that the liberalization of the external EU 
aviation markets had a clearly beneficial impact on consumer welfare in the form of lower 
fares. The results also suggest that, as a second order effect, lower fares tend to lead to 
a growth in air travel demand. It is safe to conclude from the analysis that further 
liberalization can bring additional gains to both the aviation industry and the economy as 
a whole.     
Main findings 
Air passenger traffic is up to 27 % higher in countries where an External Agreement (EA) 
is in effect, compared to those which maintain traditional BASAs with the EU. Looking at 
the effect of the three types of EU’s EAs independently, meanwhile, gives different 
results. While signing an HA leads to a higher level of passenger traffic, the other two 
agreement types, ECAA and KSP, appear to have unexpected (negative) signs. These 
effects, however, are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Higher levels of per capita GDP and population lead to higher demand. The effect of 
distance, however, is non-linear. Demand appears to increase as the distance between 
countries increases, which implies that air travel is the most preferred mode for longer 
journeys. After a certain point, distance becomes an impedance to air travel because 
social and economic interactions between countries tend to decline the farther countries 
lie apart from each other. Similarly, air transport flows between contiguous partner 
countries is found to be lower probably due to the availability of other modes. 
Interestingly, demand is higher for landlocked partners and those which share a common 
official language and colonial past, as expected.      
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There is no statistically significant increase in the growth rate of demand prior to signing 
an EA.  In fact, an EA starts to affect demand growth only after three years of its signing, 
which is reasonable given that time is needed for airlines to adjust to a new regulatory 
regime. Interestingly, the effect of an EA progressively increases with time, reaching as 
high as 45 % after 7 years.  
Related and future JRC work 
The Economics of Climate Change, Energy and Transport (JRC-ECCET) Unit of the 
Directorate Energy, Transport and Climate of the JRC supports the European Commission 
(EC) services responsible for policy making in energy and transport through the 
development and application of simulation models, quantitative evaluation methodologies 
and technology monitoring mechanisms. In this context, JRC-ECCET provides other EC 
services with techno-economic analyses and impact assessments of policy measures and 
technological developments for energy and transport. Further information on the work of 
the JRC-ECCET Unit can be found on the following JRC website: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/science-area/energy-and-transport 
Quick guide 
Section 1 of this report summarizes the research background and Section 2 provides the 
policy context for this study. Section 3 presents the empirical framework followed by 
description of the data in Section 4. Section 5 and 6 present the results and conclusions 
of the study, respectively. 
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1 Introduction 
In the last few decades, the European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of market 
liberalization in international air transport. After successfully deregulating its domestic 
market in the 1990s it started exporting its open market policies in 2005 to its 
neighbours and key strategic partners through comprehensive liberalization packages. 
Following the decision of the European Court of Justice in 2002 which overruled its 
member countries’ Bilateral Air Services Agreements (BASAs), the EU has been 
negotiating Air Services Agreements (ASAs) as a block with third countries and regional 
blocks within the framework of its external aviation policy (European Commission 2005; 
European Commission 2016). This approach was pioneering in the sense that individual 
countries handed over the economic regulation of their international air market to a 
regional body. The EU example also beckoned the era of a potential multilateral approach 
for achieving global air transport market liberalization.    
Over the last 10 years the EU has concluded or negotiated external agreements (i.e. 
ASAs with non EU countries) with 54 countries, including the Open skies policy between 
the EU and the US in 2008. While an extensive body of work that looks the effects of 
regulatory reform on the intra-European aviation market is available in the literature, 
surprisingly we know little about the economic effects of EU’s external aviation policy. 
The time for evaluation of this policy is ripe as enough time has elapsed since the road 
map for the policy was set in 2005.   
This paper explores whether routes governed by EU’s external aviation policy have lower 
fares and higher service quality compared to those governed by the traditional BASAs as 
would be expected in a liberalized air transport market. We argue that the external policy 
plays an important role in bringing the benefits of competitive market forces to travellers. 
By analysing traffic flows between EU 28 countries and 27 external partners in 4 
continents with which the EU has a varying degree of liberalization, we find that the 
external policy has led to up to a 20 % reduction in fares. These changes in fares spurred 
a 27 % increase in demand. Although it has no statistically significant effect on flight 
frequencies, we find that carriers that operate in routes governed by the policy have 
higher capacity utilization.   
Studying EU’s international aviation markets is interesting for two main reasons. First, 
although the EU has always been considered as the “vanguard” of the movement for 
liberalized international air transport markets (Borenstein and Rose, 2007), the progress 
in terms of agreements actually signed is still slow. The progress in negotiations with 
each of the EU´s external partners depends on several economic, geographic, market or 
political aspects (to name just a few) that often raise concerns as regards the impact that 
opening up of the market would have on the aviation market of the EU or its partner. 
While the overall policy strategy of the EU is building open aviation partnerships in many 
parts of the world, its recent emphasis on issues like “fair competition” and “level playing 
field” has been interpreted by some as a protectionist move (see Tretheway and 
Andriulaitis 2015; de Wit 2014). Furthermore, the lack of solid empirical 
analysis/evidence which shows the economic effects of EU’s external aviation policy has 
limited its faster implementation. By thoroughly evaluating the developments in market 
demand, fares, frequency and capacity utilization in the past 14 years this paper 
contributes to this timely and critical topic.    
The second reason for studying EU’s international aviation market is that the EU is the 
largest regional group which negotiates comprehensive ASAs on behalf of its members. 
Evaluating this policy with regard to its economic outcomes and implications is crucial to 
distil transferable insights for other aspiring regions which aim to follow EU’s example of 
plurilateral negotiation of ASAs. The study also brings empirical evidence from one of the 
most important aviation markets of the world to the table. 
This paper builds on the significant body of literature on liberalization of aviation 
markets. As pointed out by Borenstein and Rose (2007), the airline industry has been a 
prime example on how unrestricted markets achieve efficient production and allocation of 
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outputs, and on the role of government intervention in improving efficiency. Ever since 
the US deregulated its domestic air transport market in 1978, several studies have 
shown that deregulation/liberalization leads to traffic growth by removing constraints on 
pricing, market entry, flight frequency and network formation (see Fu et al 2010 and 
Borenstein and Rose 2007 for a comprehensive review). The liberalization of air transport 
has also been instrumental in lowering costs for freight transport by facilitating global 
supply chains as evidenced by the rise of air cargo’s modal share, especially for 
transporting high value goods (Hummels and  Schaur 2013; Micco and Serbrisky 2006).   
It has also been shown that competitive air transport markets result in efficiency gains 
for airlines (Fethi et al 2010; Oum et al 2005), and increased employment both in the 
aviation sector and other travel dependent sectors such as the high-tech industry and 
tourism (Button and Taylor 2000).  
The last few years saw a renewed interest in the issue of air transport liberalization from 
two different perspectives. On one hand, a number of recent studies provided new 
evaluations of the major liberalization initiatives in the US (Winston and Jan 2014; 
Cristea et al 2014), EU (Burghouwt and de Wit 2015), Africa (Abate 2016), Northeast 
Asian (Adler et al 2014), and the Middle East (Cristea 2015). At a more global level, 
using a sample of 184 countries Piermartini and Rosova (2013) find that liberalization has 
brought up to 10 % increase in air passenger flows. The interest in liberalization also 
comes from studies aimed at analysing future market developments. A long term 
forecast of the global air transport demand made by the OECD crucially depends on the 
extent to which the world progresses in terms of liberalization (Benezech et al. 2016). 
These studies not only confirm the beneficial effects of liberalization but also quantify the 
welfare effects of what could be achieved by pursuing a more liberal policy in the future. 
On the other hand, the renewed interest on liberalization comes from the fear of 
“destructive competition” (Borenstein and Rose 2007) or “heightened competition” (ICAO 
2013). This fear is fuelled by the continuous expansion of Gulf airlines (Dresner et al 
2015), the emergence of long-haul inter-continental flights by LCCs (De Poret 2015) and 
the dominance of global airline alliances (OECD 2014). These developments have 
resulted in a policy uncertainty in major aviation markets such as the EU and US to the 
extent of endangering liberalization efforts.    
Despite the above concerns the literature consistently shows that  the fortunes of the air 
transport industry is largely determined by its cost structure, demand and fuel price 
fluctuations, and infrastructure bottlenecks rather than “destructive competition” 
arguments ( Borenstien and Rose 2007). European major carriers are usually shown to 
have a higher cost base (especially labour) compared to their rivals. Some argue that 
this high cost base, not liberalization, is making Europe lag other regions in terms of 
connectivity and airline profitability to the extent of being by passed as a global-hub 
(CAPA 2016; CAPA 2014). Thanks to deregulation, the expansion of LCCs has stimulated 
cost cuts throughout the whole aviation industry. The benefits of market forces in the 
confines of the EU are well documented (Burghouwt and de Wit 2015). What remains to 
be seen is whether the EU and its partners could benefit from a more liberal aviation 
policy, which is the subject of this paper.  
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2 Policy context 
The EU’s external aviation policy aims to open up international aviation markets on legal 
and economic grounds. Following the 2002 European Court of Justice Decision which 
annulled the BASAs, the EU started to renegotiate ASAs with external partners with the 
objective of removing discrimination against “community” carriers (i.e. carriers based 
anywhere in the EU). The partners signing the new ASAs effectivity opened up their 
aviation market to all European airlines. As for the economic reasons, the external policy 
aims at promoting commerce and mobility. It is also seen as a strategic initiative which 
would improve the position of European airlines. This is especially true for European full 
service (legacy) airlines whose fortunes are substantially dependent upon long-haul 
international (non-EU) routes. Europe's Big 3 (Lufthansa, British Airways/Iberia, Air 
France-KLM) have 80% of their capacity in international markets, where competition is 
intense and new entry is commonplace (CAPA 2016).  As noted by Burghouwt and de Wit 
(2015) the external policy did also facilitate the emergence of international LCCs.  
 
Increasing the number of international aviation agreements has long been a policy 
priority for the EU (European Commission, 2012).  Agreements with strategic external 
partners were not to be limited to simply opening up markets, but sought a wider 
liberalization focus which included the liberalization of airline ownership and regulatory 
convergence in matters of safety and security, competition, environment and 
passengers´ rights. The EU external aviation strategy was updated in the recent Aviation 
Strategy for the EU (European Commission, 2015) which highlights three policy goals:  
 Stimulate growth in EU external aviation markets, through improving services, 
market access and investment opportunities with third countries, while 
guaranteeing a level playing field; 
 Overcome limits to growth, by reducing capacity constraints and improving 
efficiency and connectivity; 
 Ensure high safety and security standards, by introducing a risk and performance 
based mind-set; 
 
Three levels of agreements between the EU and external partners exist (European 
Commission 2005): 
 Horizontal Agreements (HA), which replace the pre-existing BASAs of third 
countries with all EU Member States 
 European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreements, where external partners 
adopt the EU legislation on aviation rules 
 Key Strategic Partner (KSP) agreements, which have wider liberalization focus and 
establish processes for the liberalization of airline ownership, as well as regulatory 
convergence in matters of safety and security, competition, environment and 
passengers’ rights 
 
From the European perspective, the rapidly evolving global market creates competitive 
challenges, in particular as a result of a shift of economic growth to the East. New 
competitors are benefitting from the rapid economic growth of the entire region, notably 
Asia, and from aviation becoming a strategic element in their home-country's economic 
development policies. Geography certainly plays a role for aviation markets, but several 
other factors can improve or distort competition. The availability of suitable 
infrastructure, the nature of economic, fiscal and regulatory regimes, and historic, 
cultural and trading links all play a part. This study shades light on some of the economic 
issues using the following empirical model. Christidis (2015) analyses how EU’s external 
policy has shaped air transport networks and the degree of concentration in Morocco, 
USA, Russia and Turkey.  While he finds improved air services and enhanced spatial 
distribution of airport connections in the EU-Morocco market, in the other three markets 
liberalization appears not have a significant effect well and above the existing market 
trend. Christidis notes that the air transport market is sensitive to the general economic 
and political factors the EU has with the three countries. 
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3 Empirical framework  
The empirical model in this paper is based on the proposition that the liberalization of 
international air transport market mainly affects supply side variables such as fare, 
frequency and capacity utilization. The type of data we have forced us to undertake two 
separate but related empirical analyses. The two main data sources for this study are the 
EUROSTAT online database which is publicly available and a proprietary dataset from 
Sabre® (see Section 4 for details). The former, which is an aggregate annual level data, 
is used to analyse passenger flows in the country pairs in our sample. The Sabre dataset 
includes detailed activity and price information during the months of March (off-peak 
season) and August (peak season) for the years 2002 to 2015. Although this data is only 
for two months for each year, it has richer set of variables. Most importantly, it includes 
average base fare data charged by airlines operating in the country pair markets. 
Furthermore, the data from 2010 to 2015 includes departure frequency information 
which allows us to analyse the effect of EU’s external policy on service quality.  
   
3.1 Air transport demand 
We begin our empirical analysis by specifying a model of annual passenger flows. To 
estimate the impact of liberalization on air passenger flows, we rely on the time series 
dimension of the EUROSTAT data. Akin to the “difference-in-differences” estimation 
method, our identification strategy compares the change in passenger flows within a 
country pair before and after the introduction of EU’s external policy (treatment group), 
with the corresponding flows calculated for countries that maintain traditional BASA with 
the EU (control group).  Following the literature, we employ the following gravity-type 
model for examining air transport flows (demand) between countries.    
 
ijtjttjiijt uXEALogPAX  21 )()1(   
 
Where, the dependent variable 
ijtLogPAX is the total (non-directional) number of air 
passenger travellers between an EU country i and an external partner j in year t; i , j  
and t  are EU country, partner country and time fixed effects, respectively;   stands for 
an idiosyncratic error term. The use of aggregate country-level flow rather than route-
level or route-and-carrier-specific data is due to lack of data. The EUROSTAT website 
provides airport-level flows for some of the countries in our sample but not in a 
consistent manner spanning the study period. Using such an aggregated flow forces us to 
make a strong symmetry assumption with respect to airline behaviour. While such an 
approach doesn’t allow us to control for the effect of firm/route heterogeneity, it allows 
analysing aggregate or average market behaviour as suggested by Schipper et al (2002) 
and Dresner and Tretheway (1992). Country pair level analysis can also be more 
informative because ASAs are negotiated at the country-pair and not at the route/carrier 
level. 
 
The main explanatory variable of interest in Equation 1 is, jtEA , which is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for periods when an External Agreement (EA) is in effect between 
the EU and partner country j. The EU’s external aviation policy is aimed at fostering a 
competitive aviation market by improving market access for airlines. To the extent that 
the pursuant competition from opening up of aviation markets leads to lower fares 
and/or higher service quality, travellers can be expected to fly more. We, therefore, 
expect EA to have a positive effect on the annual number of air passengers. 
Equation 1 includes standard control variables in vector X such as:  distance, the distance 
in kilometres between the most populated cities in countries i and j; contiguity, whether 
countries share a common boarder; colony, whether countries share colonial history; and 
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language, whether countries have similar official language. As noted by Piermartini and 
Rosova 2013 the effect of distance on passenger flow is likely to be non-linear. As the 
distance between two countries increases passengers give more preference to air 
transport over other modes of transportation. For countries which are far away from each 
other, however, distance becomes an 'impedance' variable for air passenger flow because 
social and economic interactions between countries tend to decline with it. Furthermore, 
air fare becomes prohibitively high beyond certain distance which reduces the flow of 
passengers. To account for both opposing effects of distance on passenger flow, we 
include two variables: distance and the square of distance.  
 
Similarly, we expect a negative effect of having a common border on the volume of 
passenger flows. This is due to the likely presence of alternative modes of transport. On 
the other hand, we expect a higher flow of passengers if a partner country is landlocked 
and shares a common colonial history and language with an EU country. Finally, Equation 
1 controls for additional variables commonly referred to as 'generative' variables because 
they reflect the catchment area for potential travellers. These are the population and 
GDP of route end countries, which are expected to generate higher level of passenger 
flows as both increase.  
 
There are two econometric challenges associated with estimating Equation 1. First, it is 
possible that the EU might have more incentive to get into an external agreement with 
countries with which it stands to get the most. This puts an upward bias in our estimate 
of the effect of the external policy because some omitted variables affect the likelihood of 
signing EU’s external agreement. This problem is particularly acute for partner countries 
which signed the Key Strategic Partners (KSP) agreement, and to some extent those 
which singed the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreement, because it is likely 
that the EU anticipated a future growth of air transport to these partners. It is, however, 
less relevant for Horizontal Agreement (HA) partner countries because as of 2002 all of 
EU member states BASAs were replaced by an external agreement following the ruling by 
the European Court of Justice. We can, therefore, safely assume that signing the HA is a 
decision imposed exogenously by the Court and not a decision taken based on the 
underlying or anticipated traffic growth. To account for the possibility that some omitted 
variables affect the likelihood of signing an external agreement, we evaluate the effect of 
each of the three external polices, that are HA, ECAA and KSP, in separate regressions. 
We also look at the effect of signing any of these agreements. 
 
The second econometric challenge is that there are changes in the growth rates of air 
transport demand that happen to coincide with the signing EU’s external policy. To 
investigate this possibility, we follow the lead of Cristea et al. (2014) and estimate the 
following growth equation:  
 
ijtjttjiijt gXtEAgPAX   )*()2( 1  
  
Where ijtgPAX  is the growth rate of passenger flow; the external agreement dummy 
(EA) interacts with a vector of time dummies corresponding to one lead and seven lags of 
the signing of the external aviation agreement. The leads and lags dummies enable us to 
see whether passenger traffic was already growing prior to signing of the external 
agreement, or whether changes in growth rates correspond to the year the agreements 
were signed. Equation 2 also includes the growth rates of the population and GDP 
variables and other control variables explained under Equation 1 above in vector gX.    
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3.2 The effect of liberalization on fare, departure frequency and 
capacity utilization  
 
The Sabre data allow us to specify detailed demand, fare and departure frequency 
models. Because fare and other supply side variables are not included in the demand 
model in Equation 1, the EA dummy might pick up the effect of supply variables. While 
the EU’s external air transport policy, as in any other liberalization initiative, can 
potentially increase demand, we maintain the assumption that its effect on demand is 
indirect. Put differently, air transport demand increases as a result of lower fare and/or 
higher service quality, variables which are more likely to be directly affected by changes 
in regulatory policy.  We start by specifying the following demand equation:  
 
ijmijmmjiijm XLogfareLogpax   )()3( 1  
  
where subscript m denotes months March and August; ijmLogpax  denotes the total 
(non-directional) number of travellers; ijmLogfare  is the base round trip fare; X  is a 
vector which contains the control variables defined under Equation 1 above. All 
continuous variables are in logarithm which allows us to interpret coefficient estimates as 
elasticity. The effect of fare is expected to be negative and captures the slope of the 
demand curve. We treat the fare variable as endogenous due to the simultaneous 
determination of supply and demand.  Section 3.3 explains how we handle the 
endogeneity problem. 
    
An important effect of liberalization of international air transport is its effect on fare. 
Restrictive regulatory environment incentives airlines to engage in collusive practices 
which lead to higher fares (Dresenr and Tretheway 1992). The relaxation of the 
regulatory environment, on the other hand, brings competition which in turn leads to a 
decline in fare.  The fare model is specified as: 
 
ijmijmjtmjiijm ZLogpaxEALogfare   )()()4( 21  
  
The main variable of interest, that is jtEA , is expected to have a negative effect. The 
effect of ijmLogpax  on fare is of empirical matter. Higher demand could lead to higher 
fare if there is capacity constraint (e.g. scarce slot at airports, which is a common 
problem at many European hubs) or it could lead to lower fares if carriers realize 
economies of density. Z contains vector of control variables such as fuel price, distance 
and per capital GDP. The country and year fixed effects capture unobserved 
heterogeneity in the cost of operating planes across routes and time. The ijmLogpax
variable is treated as endogenous in Equation 4 to avoid the simultaneity bias.   
 
As noted in Footnote 4, it might not be informative to estimate a frequency model for our 
sample due to data unavailability. Carriers may respond to an increase in demand or a 
change in regulatory environment by increasing aircraft capacity or by increasing flight 
frequency. Judging by the trend of aircraft size in our sample (Figure 5), compared to 
2002 level, seats per flight are higher by 30 % in 2015 for external policy partner 
countries which implies that it might be difficult estimate a frequency model. This is 
further compounded by the lack of market structure information for our sample such as 
the number of carriers in a market.  Alternatively, as suggested by Winston and Jan 
(2015), we estimate the effect of liberalization on capacity utilization, measured by the 
level of the load factor (LF). It is more likely that route rationalization in the wake the 
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external agreement, allows carriers to improve the load factor. Accordingly we consider 
the following model of capacity utilization:  
 
ijmjtmjiijm YEALogLF   21 )()5(  
 
   
3.3 Estimation and model identification  
 
The estimation of the demand and fare equations poses two main econometric 
challenges. The first one is simultaneity bias because demand and supply (fare) are 
determined simultaneously at equilibrium. Secondly, the panel nature of our dataset 
raises potential concerns of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. To account for these 
challenges, we estimate Equations 3 and 4 using both two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) 
and three-stage-least-squares (3SLS) procedures. These methods require the use of 
specific instruments for endogenous variables. The selection of instruments is based on 
the literature and data availability.   
 
In the 2SLS procedure, we use fuel price interacting with the distance and the 
liberalization indicators as instruments for fare in the demand model, i.e. Equation 3.  
Fuel costs are one of the major components of carriers operating costs, especially during 
our sample period which saw the doubling of jet fuel prices from their 2002 level. 
Interacting fuel price with distance captures the possibility that fuel costs are more 
important for shorter flights. This is because most of an aircraft’s fuel burn occurs during 
take-offs and landings, which makes fuel costs relatively higher for shorter trips 
compared to longer trips. In the fare regression, i.e. Equation 4, we instrument for 
demand through the following variables: a dummy variable which indicates whether 
countries have colonial relationship/common language, population of endpoint countries 
and bilateral trade between them.   
 
Both the 2SLS and 3SLS procedures address endogeneity concerns. Their implementation 
procedure, however, has advantages and disadvantages. The sequential nature of the 
2SLS procedure, while allowing each equation to be interpreted separately, does not fully 
capture the simultaneity between fare and demand.  The 3SLS procedure effectively 
solves the endogeneity problem because it estimates all equations simultaneously akin to 
the seemingly unrelated regressions procedure (Zellner and Theil, 1962).  It is, however, 
more sensitive to model misspecification compared to 2SLS (Kennedy, 2003).  We apply 
both models for comparisons purposes.  
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4 Data  
 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on data from two main sources. We 
gathered annual passenger volume and flight frequencies at country-pair level between 
EU 28 and 27 external (non-EU) countries from the EUROSTAT online database for the 
period 2002-2014 (EUROSTAT- table avia_pae, 2014).While the EUROSTAT database is 
one of the very few publicly available sources of information to analyse traffic 
developments in Europe, it has two main limitations. First, it does not report fare and 
other supply characteristics which are important for our analysis. Second, it does not 
report “true” origin-destination (OD) pair flows of passengers and flight. The EUROSTAT 
data include passenger flows between country-pairs that have origins and/or destinations 
beyond the international segment country-pairs. 
 
Data from Sabre was used in order to complement the analysis by filtering “true” country 
pair OD passenger flows (Sabre 2016). Most importantly, the Sabre data provide us with 
information on fare, load factor and departure frequency, variables which are crucial for 
studying the impact of air transport market liberalization. Unfortunately, we could only 
gather data for two months per year, March, for an off-peak season, and August, for a 
peak-season. While the Sabre data limits our ability to analyse annual changes in traffic 
activity, it allows us to capture seasonality.   
 
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators online database is the source of country 
GDP and population variables (WDI 2016). Gravity variables (official language, colonial 
relationship, landlocked, contiguity and distance) are from Bacchetta et al. (2012). The 
trade data that is total value of exports and imports between OD pairs, come from United 
Nations’ Commodity Trade Statistics Database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/ ) Jet fuel 
prices were gathered from US Energy Information Administration website 
(https://www.eia.gov/).       
 
The status of air services regulation between the EU and our sample of partner countries 
is given on Table 1. The list of countries represents a wide range of geographic coverage, 
market size (traffic densities) and stage lengths (flight distances). Most importantly, the 
sample is composed of partner countries with a varying degree of regulatory status with 
the EU. In addition to external policy partner countries, Table 1 lists EU’s partners with 
which air transport service is based on traditional BASAs. We include BASA partner 
countries in our sample for econometric reasons. We use the so called difference-in-
differences (DID) methodology to identify the effects of EU’s external aviation policy 
agreements on fare, load factor and frequency using BASA partner countries as a control 
group assuming that their regulatory status was unchanged. Doing so helps us overcome 
the lack of counterfactuals which beset earlier evaluations of air transport policies 
(Pitfield, 2009). 
 
Table 1. List of Partners and Status of EU’s External Aviation Policy  
External  
Partner  
Year-Most 
Current 
Agreement 
Year- Horizontal 
Agreement 
Type of 
Agreement 
Albania 2006 2006 HA 
Algeria 
  
BASA 
Argentina 
  
BASA 
Armenia 2008 2008 HA 
Azerbaijan 2009 2009 HA 
Brazil 2011 2011 KSP 
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External  
Partner  
Year-Most 
Current 
Agreement 
Year- Horizontal 
Agreement 
Type of 
Agreement 
Canada 2009 
 
KSP 
Chile 2005 2005 HA 
China 
  
BASA 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
  
BASA 
Georgia 2010 2008 ECAA/HA 
Israel 2013 2008 ECAA/EUMED 
Japan 2009 2009 HA 
Jordan 2010 2008 HA 
Lebanon 2006 2006 HA 
Libya 
  
BASA 
Macedonia, 
FYR 2008 2008 ECAA/HA 
Moldova 2012 2008 ECAA/HA 
Morocco 2006 2006 ECAA/EUMED 
Oman 
  
BASA 
Qatar 
  
BASA 
Russian 
Federation 
  
BASA 
Saudi Arabia 
  
BASA 
Tunisia 
  
BASA 
Turkey 2010 2010 HA 
Ukraine 2006 2005 HA 
United Arab 
Emirates 2007 2007 HA 
United States 2007 
 
KSP 
 
Note: Table lists Partner countries analysed in this study with which the EU has the three types of external 
aviation agreements:  Horizontal Agreement (HA), European Common Aviation Area Agreement (ECAA) 
or the Key Strategic Partners (KSP) Agreement. For a complete list of countries with which the EU has an 
agreement related to air transport or with which such an agreement is currently under negotiation see 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/index_en.htm  
 
Figures 1A and 1B display trends in passenger traffic and flights observed in the 
EUROSTAT data. During the sample period we see a tripling of extra EU passenger traffic 
flow and quadrupling of flight frequencies for partner countries with an external 
agreement with the EU. The same increasing trend, albeit at a lower rate, is shown for 
partner countries with traditional BASA arrangements. Figure 2 shows that average base 
fare (nominal) for external agreement partner countries has remained relatively flat, and 
in fact declined by 25 % by the end of the sample period. Although these comparisons do 
not hold any other influences on fares constant, they reveal that fare levels have been 
relativity lower for routes operated under external agreement. Evidently, August fares 
are higher compared to their March levels confirming the peak season yield management 
practice of airlines.  
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Figure 1. Annual Passenger Flow and Flight Frequency Index Using Eurostat Data  
 
1A : Total Passenger Flow        1B : Total Annual Flight Frequency 
           
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
 
Figure 2. Average Base Fare (Nominal) Trend  
 
Source: Sabre 
 
 
The relationship between yields (average fare per kilometre) and distance are consistent 
with findings in the literature for deregulated markets (Morrison and Winston) and recent 
findings for open skies routes in the US (Winston and Jan, 2014). As seen in Figure 3, 
yield declines with route distance because the fixed costs of take-off and landing are 
distributed over longer distances (economies of distance). Figure 4 shows that capacity 
utilization, measured by the load factor, has also been increasing. In general, capacity 
utilization for external partner country routes is relatively smoother for both March and 
August months, and it is higher for external policy partners for all but three years for 
August. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 5, aircraft size, measured as seat per departure 
suggests that carriers operating in routes under EU external aviation agreement saw a 
much higher rate of introduction of larger aircrafts. This is reasonable as our sample 
period saw the introduction of bigger aircrafts such as the Airbus 380 and Boeing 787, 
which appear to be used more frequently in routes involving external agreement 
signatory countries.   
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Figure 3. Yields over Distance, year 2014 
  
Source: Own calculation based on Sabre data.  
 
Figure 4. Capacity Utilization Trend  
 
Source: Own calculation based on Sabre data  
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Figure 5. Aircraft Size Growth Index  
 
Source: Own calculation from Sabre schedule data  
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5 Results  
Table 2 presents estimation results from the demand model specified in Equation 1. The 
results are, in general, consistent with conventional wisdom and expectation. Air 
passenger traffic is up to 27 % higher in countries where an EA is in effect compared to 
those which maintain traditional BASAs with the EU. Looking at the effect of the three 
types of EU’s EAs independently, meanwhile, gives different results. While signing an HA 
leads to a higher level of passenger traffic, the other two agreement types, ECAA and 
KSP, appear to have unexpected (negative) signs. These effects, however, are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  
 
The remaining explanatory variables have plausible signs and are mostly significant at 
least at the 10 % level. As expected, higher levels of per capita GDP and population lead 
to higher demand. The effect of distance is non-linear. Demand appears to increase as 
the distance between countries increases, which implies that air travel is the most 
preferred mode for longer journeys. After a certain point, however, distance becomes an 
impedance to air travel because social and economic interactions between countries tend 
to decline the farther countries lie apart from each other. Similarly, air transport flows 
between contiguous partner countries is found to be lower probably due to the 
availability of other modes. Interestingly, demand is higher for landlocked partners and 
those which share a common official language and colonial past, as expected.      
Table 3 presents results from Equation 2 which specifies covariates of the growth rate of 
air transport demand. The purpose of this estimation is to check whether the signing an 
EA coincides with underlying trend of air traffic to the signatory partners. As it turns out, 
there is no statistically significant increase in the growth rate of demand prior to signing 
an EA.  In fact, an EA starts to affect demand growth only after three years of its signing, 
which is reasonable given that time is needed for airlines to adjust to a new regulatory 
regime. Interestingly, the effect of an EA progressively increases with time, reaching as 
high as 45 % after 7 years.  
While the results in Table 2 are broadly consistent with expectations, the data we used 
for estimation are rather aggregate. Table 4 presents results from the demand model 
specified in Equation 3. The most important difference here is that in addition to the 
“gravity type variables”, demand is now a function of fare. For both months, we find a 
price elastic demand. Passengers in the month of March show slightly higher price 
sensitivity, which is expected given that this an offseason period when airlines usually 
offer deals. 
 
Tables 5A and 5B present the fare model specified in Equation 4 for the months of March 
and August, respectively. Looking at the main variables of interest, HA and ECAA type 
agreements have significant negative effects on fare levels for both months. While 
signing any of EU’s external agreements affects fare negatively in August, it does not 
affect March fares. These results are expected because liberalization leads to price 
reduction as result of competition. What is unexpected is the positive effect of signing of 
KSP type agreements on fare for both months. This is partly due to the econometric 
challenges mentioned in Section 3 as it is difficult to control for unobserved effects that 
simultaneously affect the probability of signing the ECAA and KSP type agreements and 
the level of air traffic flow. These mixed results could also be due to not having a good 
comparator (counter-factual) country, especially for the three KSP signatory countries 
namely, USA, Canada and Brazil. Another interesting result is that the number of 
passengers has a negative and significant effect on fare. This result implies the presence 
of excess capacity and/or realization of economies of traffic density (Nero, 1998).  
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Table 2. Determinants of International Passenger Traffic 
 
Any EA HA ECAA KSP Dependent variable: 
Log. PAX 
     
Any EA 0.246** 
   
 
-0.105 
   
HA 
 
0.243** 
  
  
-0.104 
  
ECAA 
  
-0.0985 
 
   
-0.129 
 
KSP 
   
-0.0541 
    
-0.215 
Log per capita GDP 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 
 
-0.0183 -0.0183 -0.0184 -0.0186 
Log. population 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
 
-0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0114 -0.0114 
Log. distance 3.511*** 3.504*** 3.464*** 3.479*** 
 
-1.142 -1.142 -1.144 -1.144 
Log. distance 
squared 
-
0.428*** 
-
0.428*** 
-
0.425*** 
-
0.426*** 
 
-0.0802 -0.0802 -0.0803 -0.0803 
Colonial Relationship 0.280* 0.281* 0.276* 0.277* 
 
-0.155 -0.155 -0.155 -0.155 
Contiguous partner 
-
0.657*** 
-
0.658*** 
-
0.657*** 
-
0.657*** 
 
-0.184 -0.185 -0.184 -0.184 
Common official 
language 
1.706*** 1.707*** 1.708*** 1.707*** 
 
-0.19 -0.191 -0.191 -0.191 
Land locked partner 2.807*** 2.790*** 0.902*** 2.762*** 
 
-0.292 -0.291 -0.253 -0.292 
Constant 
-
39.10*** 
-
38.62*** 
-
38.29*** 
-
38.34*** 
  -5.471 -5.466 -5.475 -5.492 
Observations 7,085 7,085 7,085 7,085 
R-squared 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.611 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Any EA is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a partner country has signed any of the three External 
Agreements of the EU, namely: Horizontal Agreement (HA), European Common Aviation Area Agreement 
(ECAA) or the Key Strategic Partners Agreement (KSP). 
Standard errors: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
Table 3. Effect of EU’s External Agreement (EA) on Passenger Growth 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
 gLog. PAX 
Lags and 
Lead 
  
Any EA  
 
  
Year Prior to EA -0.0347 
 
-0.118 
Year EA Signed  0.124 
 
-0.113 
1 Year After EA 0.11 
 
-0.12 
2 Year After EA 0.18 
 
-0.127 
3 Year After EA 0.259* 
 
-0.134 
4 Year After EA 0.299** 
 
-0.136 
5 Year After EA 0.22 
 
-0.154 
6 Year After EA 0.290* 
 
-0.175 
7 Year After EA 0.447** 
 
-0.192 
Constant 
-
15.04*** 
 
-3.331 
  
Observations 6,966 
R-squared 0.104 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
    
 
Note: The regressions on Table 3 controls for other variables, namely growth rates of per capita GDP and 
population, distance, distance squared, language, contiguity, and colonial and landlocked dummies. 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Two-stage Least Squares Demand Model   
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: logpax March August 
   
Log fare -1.839*** -1.824*** 
 
-0.504 -0.572 
Log per capita GDP 0.0742*** 0.0975*** 
 
-0.0084 -0.0088 
Log population  0.113*** 0.0788*** 
 
-0.0146 -0.0164 
Log distance 9.194*** 11.57*** 
 
-1.169 -1.191 
Log distance squared  -0.782*** -0.934*** 
 
-0.0844 -0.0873 
Colonial Relationship  0.504*** 0.442*** 
 
-0.155 -0.162 
Contiguous partner   0.0248 -0.127 
 
-0.206 -0.232 
Common official language  1.945*** 1.857*** 
 
-0.168 -0.171 
Constant -79.45*** -96.22*** 
 
-7.133 -7.319 
   
Observations 4,901 5,119 
R-squared 0.602 0.585 
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5A. Two-stage Least Squares Estimates of Fare model: March 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
logfare 
Any lib H lib NEB lib Key lib 
     
Any EA 0.0126 
   
 
-0.0204 
   
HA 
 
-
0.0560***   
  
-0.0205 
  
ECAA 
  
-0.230*** 
 
   
-0.0278 
 
KSP 
   
0.278*** 
    
-0.0327 
Log 
passengers 
no.  
-
0.0237*** 
-
0.0242*** 
-
0.0239*** 
-0.0224** 
 
-0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0091 -0.0091 
Log per 
capita GDP 
0.00409** 0.00404** 0.00404** 0.00522*** 
 
-0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 
Log distance  0.169*** 0.168*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 
 
-0.237 -0.237 -0.235 -0.236 
Log fuel 
price  
0.322*** 0.319*** 0.334*** 0.333*** 
 
-0.0509 -0.0508 -0.0506 -0.0506 
Constant 4.612*** 4.667*** 4.624*** 3.984*** 
 
-1.488 -1.481 -1.471 -1.472 
     
Observations 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 
R-squared 0.698 0.699 0.703 0.702 
Country 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5B. Two-stage Least Squares Estimates of  Fare model – August 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
logfare 
Any lib H lib NEB lib Key lib 
     
     
Any EA 
-
0.0612***    
 
-0.0198 
   
HA 
 
-0.110*** 
  
  
-0.0198 
  
ECAA 
  
-0.197*** 
 
   
-0.0266 
 
KSP 
   
0.207*** 
    
-0.0317 
Log 
passengers 
no.  
-0.0216** -0.0217** -0.0212** -0.0206** 
 
-0.0089 -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.0089 
Log per 
capita GDP 
0.00360** 0.00381** 0.00390** 0.00482*** 
 
-0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 
Log distance  0.215*** 0.217*** 0.220*** 0.224*** 
 
-0.027 -0.027 -0.0269 -0.027 
Log fuel 
price  
0.401*** 0.402*** 0.418*** 0.421*** 
 
-0.0498 -0.0496 -0.0495 -0.0496 
Constant 2.359** 2.219** 2.059** 1.431 
 
-1.014 -1.005 -1.002 -1.008 
     
Observations 5,118 5,118 5,118 5,118 
R-squared 0.694 0.695 0.696 0.695 
Country 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 presents results from models of capacity utilization specified in Equation 6. The 
signs of the explanatory variables are broadly plausible. The load factor is higher in 
routes with higher volumes of passengers. While it has the right positive sign, the EU’s 
external policy is only significant for the off season month of March. This finding implies 
that, everything else being equal, planes are fuller during low seasons when an EP is 
place. Another interesting result is the quadratic effect of distance on capacity utilization. 
This non-linear effect reveals the trade-off airlines face in allocating their fleet to different 
flight segments. Normally, aircraft size increases with flight distance which in turn can 
lower load factor (as filling up a larger aircraft is harder). After a certain distance, 
however, load factor improve because of the prohibitive cost of operating a partially filled 
large aircraft over a long distance.   
As noted in Section 3, estimating a frequency model for our sample could be problematic 
due to data unavailability. For the sake of completeness, however, we looked at 
determinants of flight frequency including EA dummies. The results from this model are 
presented on Table 6. It appears that signing an external agreement has a positive but 
statistically insignificant effect.  Interestingly, the coefficient of passenger numbers 
suggests that an increase in the number of passengers results in a less-than-proportional 
increase in departure frequency. Schipper et al (2002) also found a similar result for 
intra-European air transport markets. Their explanation indicates that, at constant 
aircraft size, an increase in the number of passengers is accommodated partially by a 
frequency increase and partially by an increase in the load factor, as shown in our result 
above.  Finally, both distance and aircraft size have the expected negative effect on 
frequency and are highly significant at the 1% level.  Distance is a major ‘impedance’ 
variable that causes the departure frequency to decrease. Operating a larger aircraft 
(i.e., increasing the number of seats per flight) effectively results in a decline in total 
departure frequency.  
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Table 6. 2SLS Estimates of Capacity Utilization and Frequency   
 
  Load Factor Frequency  
  March August March August  
     
Log 
passengers no.  
0.0978*** 0.0804*** 0.862*** 0.837*** 
 
-0.0069 -0.00524 -0.0124 -0.012 
Any EA 0.0469*** 4.41E-05 0.00051 0.0349 
 
-0.0166 -0.014 -0.145 -0.125 
Log distance  -0.692*** -0.0544 -0.272*** -0.324*** 
 
-0.177 -0.149 -0.0343 -0.0324 
Log distance 
squared  
0.0576*** 0.00979 
  
 
-0.0126 -0.0106 
  
Log aircraft 
size   
-0.697*** -0.598*** 
   
-0.0475 -0.0389 
Constant 5.148*** 3.323*** 2.143*** 2.311*** 
  -0.618 -0.514 -0.372 -0.366 
Observations 3,956 3,915 1,536 1,561 
R-squared 0.385 0.331 0.935 0.957 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6 Conclusions  
The international air transport is being transformed. The movement of the aviation 
industry’s centre of gravity towards Asia, the emergence of long-haul inter-continental 
LCCs and questions over the competition effect of global alliances have all reignited the 
interest on the issue of liberalization in aviation. These developments have presented 
European regulators with the challenge to balance fair competition concerns with the 
push for multilateral liberalization of the aviation industry which they have championed 
for decades. Other than few anecdotal studies arguing for or against further opening of 
EU’s international aviation market, there is a scarcity of academic papers on the 
economic effects  EU’s external aviation policy.    
 
In order to fill this gap, this paper examined the economic effects of EU’s external 
aviation policy by studying country-pair markets between EU28 countries and 27 external 
partners. Passenger demand, fare, frequency and load factor models were estimated in 
order to analyse the causal effects of the policy in reducing fare and improving service 
quality and capacity utilization. The results show up to 20% decrease in the average base 
fare when an agreement with the EU to open the market exists. The changes in fares 
subsequently stimulated an increase in passenger volumes of 27%. We find that carriers 
that operate in routes governed by the agreements have higher capacity utilization. 
  
However, our analysis of the effect of the policy on frequency did not identify a 
statistically significant effect. The individual effects of the three types of EU’s external 
aviation policy, however, led to some counter-intuitive results. The difficulty of finding 
suitable countries for comparison with the counter-factual and the lack of disaggregated 
data may pose some limitations to the interpretability of the results. The overall evidence 
is nevertheless strong enough to suggest that the liberalization of the external EU 
aviation markets had a clearly beneficial impact on aviation activity and consumer 
welfare.  It is also safe to conclude from the results that further liberalization can bring 
additional gains to both the aviation industry and the economy as a whole.    
  
Admittedly, there will always be winners and losers in a competitive air transport market 
as in any other industry. The growing competition between the various market players at 
global level may, in addition, raise additional concerns as regards the role of policy 
intervention in the aviation industry. Future research can enrich our understanding on 
these issues by looking at the welfare effects of EU’s external aviation policy by looking 
at economy wide effects of the policy including its effect on air cargo. 
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